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Fiddling with Federal Circuit Precedent:
The Commercial and Qualitative Impact
of Recent Supreme Court Reversals on
the U.S. Patent System
Christopher J. Hamersky*
Prior to 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
enjoyed a fairly laissez-faire relation with the Supreme Court of
the United States, enabling it to develop a patent law jurisprudence that patent practitioners could confidently rely on given that
it had remained relatively stable for several decades. However, in
2006, the Supreme Court reviewed eBay v. MercExchange and
subsequently began a string of frequent Federal Circuit reversals
that have caused significant change to the U.S. patent system.
Whereas the Supreme Court rarely took up patent appeals in the
Federal Circuit’s early history, it now routinely reviews patent
questions each term and often reverses Federal Circuit precedent
to fundamentally change the patent law jurisprudence.
This Note endeavors to review several of the most impactful
decisions from the last two decades of patent law jurisprudence in
order to showcase the extent to which prior patent norms were
upended. In juxtaposing these highlighted, fundamental changes in
U.S. patent jurisprudence against the different protections and
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litigation procedures offered in jurisdictions abroad, this Note
stresses the importance of immediate congressional action to
rectify an apparent decline in the U.S. patent system and notes
what concerns to specifically address in order to repair the system
as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
To say the U.S. patent system has been experiencing some
turbulence in the past decade or so would be putting it mildly.
Since around 1996, the patent system has experienced increasing
numbers of both substantive and procedural shifts1 that have categorically changed the way patent practitioners and commercial
entities operate.2 These changes have come from both legislative
action3 and judicial decisions,4 though it is the latter that is seemingly causing more uncertainty and thus arguably “weakening” the
viability of the patent system from a global perspective.5 In particular, it is the frequent reversal of Federal Circuit precedent by
the Supreme Court that most routinely causes upheavals in the
patent system as practitioners know it.6
This idea, that the Supreme Court has recently upended patent
law, is in no way new. At this point, seemingly all patent practitioners have at some point vocalized their concerns in some
capacity as to the significance of these changes and argued over
whether the change was warranted. 7 This is in part because the
1

See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
(holding that the terms comprising patent claims are to be determined by a judge, not a
jury). Consequently, a Markman hearing has become a keystone piece to any patent
litigation, thus fundamentally changing the norm of patent disputes in the United States.
See
J. Michael Jakes, Using an Expert at a Markman Hearing: Practical and Tactical
Considerations, FINNEGAN (Aug. 2002), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/using-anexpert-at-a-markman-hearing-practical-and-tactical.html [https://perma.cc/9ZM8-AGZJ]
(noting how Markman effectively “added ‘Markman’ to [the patent community’s]
professional vocabulary and created a new proceeding . . . in patent litigation”).
2
This is not to imply that there were no substantive or procedural changes in patent
law prior to 1996, only that there was a sharp increase in the frequency of significant
changes following Markman. See infra Sections I, II.a–i.
3
See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (changing the U.S. patent
system from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system, altering post-grant opposition
actions, and tweaking the timelines on which inventors and their attorneys operate)
[hereinafter AIA].
4
See infra Sections I, II.a–i.
5
See infra Sections I, II.a–i.
6
See infra Sections I, II.a–i.
7
See generally Darren Smyth, The IP Kat in Despair—What Is to Be Done When
Senior Courts Don’t Understand Novelty?, IP KAT (May 9, 2013), https://ipkitten.blog
spot.com/2013/05/the-ipkat-in-despair-what-is-to-be-done.html [https://perma.cc/5NFF-
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Supreme Court very seldom granted certiorari to appeals from the
Federal Circuit during the lower court’s early history.8 Accordingly, the increased scrutiny has fallen squarely on ascertaining the
rationale behind the Supreme Court’s turbulent patent decisions
since 2006.9 Said rationale, of course, has proven elusive and thus
led to conjecture.
One of the more common reasons speculated is that the Supreme Court Justices just do not understand the subject material
coming before them on patent appeals, even if said appeals contain
mountains of expert testimony and scientific aids to the layman in
grasping the technical details behind a dispute.10 Consequently, the
speculated unfamiliarity with the inventive matters at hand supposedly hinders decision-making because the Justices are seemingly
either unable to appreciate the extent to which the parties have
invested in the subject material or are unable to sufficiently forecast what ripple effects a contemplated change in patent law would
have.11 Although proponents of this reasoning assert that there is
clear evidence to support this rationale as the reason behind the
recent string of patent decisions from the Supreme Court,12 there is
arguably a more subtle, on-point explanation for the recent series
of patent law reversals over the last decade or so: a perceived lack
of uniformity and an interest in bringing patent law more in line
with the Court’s general jurisprudence.
JAAG]; Emma Barraclough, US Supreme Court Rewrites Rules on Patent Exhaustion,
WIPO (Aug. 2017), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/04/article_0008.html
[https://
perma.cc/2KNK-M4J8]; Gene Quinn, Did the Supreme Court Intentionally Destroy the
U.S. Patent System?, IP WATCHDOG (May 22, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/
05/22/did-the-supreme-court-intentionally-destroy-the-u-s-patent-system/id=97514/
[https://perma.cc/F52C-NBDH].
8
See infra Section I.b.
9
See infra Section I.b.
10
See Quinn, supra note 7; David Kline, Is the Supreme Court Killing Life Science
Innovation?, MICHELSON INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 24, 2017)), https://michelson
ip.com/supreme-court-killing-life-science-innovation
[https://perma.cc/2YES-UYEC];
see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596
(2013) (Scalia, J., concurring).
11
See Quinn, supra note 7; Kline, supra note 10.
12
See Quinn, supra note 7 (“Indeed, we have proof of the folly associated with
thinking that the Supreme Court is sufficiently competent to address issues of patent law
and technology that are at the heart of American competitiveness.”).
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The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 in part to streamline
patent law disputes given such disputes’ focus on science and inventive matters, something the other courts of appeals did not necessarily handle routinely. 13 The Supreme Court has openly
acknowledged this specialization, even asking litigants at oral arguments why the high court should not defer to the specialized
court to some degree on patent matters.14 However, the Supreme
Court has also not been above expressing a modicum of reproach
should they find the lower court’s jurisprudence to be lacking with
regard to consistency.15 Such expressions never quite rise to the
level of contempt, but there are several express instances of reproach that would indicate that the Justices are willing to move
forward on patent matters with less deference to the Federal Circuit.16 Consequently, they have since begun granting certiorari to
more patent disputes than before and in turn are creating waves for
both patent practitioners and the commercial entities heavily interested in a stable patent system.17
Given the perceived lack of uniformity within the Federal
Circuit and continued lack of additional congressional intent with
regard to the patent system,18 the Supreme Court now evidently
13

See Rodney F. Page & Ellen E. Sward, The Federal Courts Improvement Act:
A Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 387 (1984) (“The Federal Circuit,
for example, is a compromise between specialization, which can produce uniformity, and
generalization, which can prevent stagnation.”); see also Federal Court Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
14
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9:1–9:5, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014) (No. 12-1184) (Chief Justice Roberts asking litigants,
“why shouldn’t [the Supreme Court] give some deference to the decision of the court that
was set up to develop patent law in a uniform way? They have a much better idea than
[the Supreme Court] do[es] about the consequences of these fee awards in particular
cases.”).
15
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26:5–26:11, Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health
Mgmt. Sys., 572 U.S. 559 (2014) (No. 12-1163) (Chief Justice Roberts stating that “the
Federal Circuit was established to bring about uniformity in patent law, but they seem to
have a great deal of disagreement among themselves and are going back and forth in
particular cases, in this area specifically, about what the appropriate approach is”).
16
See id.; see also Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 921
(2014) (Justice Alito writing that the Federal Circuit’s analysis of a case “fundamentally
misunderstands what it means to infringe a [specific type of] patent”).
17
See infra Sections I, II.a–i.
18
Congress’s last substantial change to the patent system came in 2011 with the
America Invents Act. See AIA, supra note 3.
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defers to the Federal Circuit only occasionally.19 More often, the
Court instead now reverses Federal Circuit decisions by applying
more general legal principles rather than principles developed
by the Federal Circuit over several decades to better resolve patent
disputes.20 These reversals and departures from the long-term jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit ultimately harm the U.S. patent
system as a whole. 21 By upending what practitioners believe to
be well-established Federal Circuit precedent22 that inventors and
industries rely on in planning their commercial strategies, the
Supreme Court’s actions create uncertainty, which inadvertently
discourages certain innovation, important investment, and in some
cases, may actually divert would-be patentees to alternative jurisdictions like China and Europe.23
Again, this critique is hardly new.24 What is new, however, is
an increased sense of urgency. Aside from multiple annual reports
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that the overall quality of
the U.S. patent system has dropped significantly in recent years,25

19

See infra Sections I, II.a–i.
See infra Sections I, II.a–i.
21
See Kevin Madigan, An Ever-Weakening Patent System Is Threatening the Future of
American Innovation, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://cpip.
gmu.edu/2017/04/28/an-ever-weakening-patent-system-is-threatening-the-future-ofamerican-innovation [https://perma.cc/L763-YZ42]; see also Gene Quinn, The Top 3
Reasons the U.S. Patent System in Decline, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/26/top-3-reasons-u-s-patent-system-decline/id=
82571 [https://perma.cc/G34R-YGWB]; Paul Morinville & Terry Fokas, The U.S. Patent
System, Not China’s IP Policies, Is the Reason Behind America’s Decline in Global
Competitiveness, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/
01/u-s-patent-system-americas-decline-competitiveness/id=94249
[https://perma.cc/
LV5P-YK4T].
22
The qualifier “well-established” is used solely to juxtapose a practitioner consensus
with the Supreme Court’s apparent disagreement that the Federal Circuit jurisprudence is
sufficiently uniform. Cf. supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
23
See infra Section I.b.
24
See sources cited supra note 7.
25
See U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 117 (2017),
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2017_
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG24-DVWX]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., U.S. CHAMBER
INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 35 (2018), http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/up
loads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/33Z5-EZ9C]; U.S. CHAMBER
OF COM., U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 44 (2019), https://www.theglobal
20
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there is also the undeniable fact that innovators are increasingly
turning to foreign jurisdictions to seek patent protection since perceived uncertainty in the U.S. patent system creates sufficient
pause to preclude investment.26 Although the current Director of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), Andrei
Iancu, recognizes this issue and has begun acting to correct the decline, his actions as Director are not sufficient alone.27 To reverse
the patent system’s decline and restore certainty in the patent law
jurisprudence, Congress must enact additional patent reform to
make America’s patent system competitive again. Alternatively,
the Supreme Court must give Federal Circuit decisions greater
deference to prevent additional, significant upheavals of precedent
that shock the patent system as a whole; at the very least, the
Supreme Court must consider intellectual property (“intellectual
property” or “IP”) rights and policy to a greater extent when deciding appeals from the Federal Circuit. Thus, if the Supreme Court
more fully considers IP rights and provides greater clarity in its
opinions on appeal from the Federal Circuit such that no ambiguities remain, the U.S. patent system would better resist abrupt
changes that discourage inventors and minimize any ambiguities
that would preclude patent practitioners from offering more concrete advice to clients.
In advocating for a return to stability for the U.S. patent system, this Note follows a three-part rationalization to justify its specific proposed reform. In Part I, this Note explores the roots of the
U.S. patent system, the assorted means by which inventions were
ipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/023593_GIPC_IP_Index_2019_Full_04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E47T-ZYMY].
26
See infra Section I.b; see also Gene Quinn & Eric Guttag, SCOTUS Reversals Have
Created a Compliant Federal Circuit, IP WATCHDOG (Dec. 16, 2018), https://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/16/scotus-reversals-compliant-federal-circuit/id=103948
[https://perma.cc/YXC4-62EW]; William New, USPTO Anticipates Slight Decline in
Patent Filings, Including for PCT, IP WATCH (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.ipwatch.org/2018/02/20/uspto-anticipates-slight-decline-patent-filings-including-pct
[https://perma.cc/M3LT-R3U6]; Morinville & Fokas, supra note 21.
27
See James Korenchan, USPTO Director Addresses U.S. Patent System’s Decline in
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Worldwide Patent Projection Rankings, PATENT DOCS
(May 10, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/05/uspto-director-addresses-us-patentsystems-decline-in-us-chamber-of-commerce-worldwide-patent-protec.html
[https://perma.cc/N8C2-MVT5].
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reviewed for patent protections, how said patent protections were
asserted against infringers as a legal right, and how the advancement of science and inventions necessitated the creation of a new
circuit court to better adjudicate patent disputes. Part II delves into
several of the most impactful instances of how the Supreme Court
in the last fifteen years departed from decades-old precedent, long
relied upon by inventors and practitioners of the patent system,
which ultimately has weakened the patent system as a whole relative to its foreign counterparts and created unwelcome uncertainty
amongst those already heavily invested in the U.S. system. Finally,
Part III proposes two separate solutions to repair the U.S. patent
system’s competitiveness: one involves targeted legislation directly
addressing individual concerns about the patent system’s decline
while the other entails a plea to the judiciary to minimize existing
concerns without relying on active participation from Congress.
I. PATENTS IN REVIEW
A. Patent Fundamentals and the Industries That Rely on Them
Though there are numerous treatises that review the basics of
the U.S. patent system, an excellent summary is conveniently
provided by Justice Tom Clark in the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision, Graham v. John Deere Co.28 As expressly written into the
Constitution, Congress is authorized to “promote the Progress
of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors
the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”29 In creating a patent
system, Congress sought to spur innovation and discovery by
incentivizing the public to create or discover new and useful
machinery, compounds, or methods, deemed “useful arts.”30 The
incentive lies in Congress’s grant of a patent, itself a set of exclusive property rights conveyed to the inventor that rewards the
inventor for the discovery by permitting an effective monopoly on

28

383 U.S. 1 (1966).
See id. at 5 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
30
See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., General
Information Concerning Patents (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-gettingstarted/general-information-concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/KL6T-FHMF].
29
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the discovered invention for a set amount of time, thus allowing
the inventor to reap financial gains in exchange for informing the
public about the new and useful technology.31
Today, patent rights are generally articulated as the right to
exclude other people or entities from doing something with the
patent technology, whether that exclusion is a use, sale, or manufacture of the patented technology, but the overall premise remains
the same, albeit for a term of twenty years today.32 At the core of
the system was the idea that “[i]nnovation, advancement, and
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must
‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”33 It was the line about
“useful knowledge” that bothered Thomas Jefferson, who articulated a concern that was somewhat prophetic as that prong has
ultimately proven to be one of the most contested aspects of
today’s patent debate.34
When Congress first implemented a patent system by creating
the first iteration of the USPTO with the Patent Act of 1790,35 it
was placed within the Department of State and was to be headed
by Jefferson, the Secretary of State at the time, as well as the
Secretary of War and the Attorney General, collectively referred to
as the “Commissioners for the Promotion of Useful Arts.” 36 An
applicant could secure a patent by convincing two of the three
commissioners that their invention or discovery constituted a “useful art, manufacture, . . . or device, or any improvement therein not
before known or used . . . .”37 Jefferson, an inventor himself, was
skeptical about what would constitute useful art, not wanting timed
monopolies to be granted to inventors of “small details, obvious
improvements, or frivolous devices.” 38 Because he believed that
31
See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6; see also General Information Concerning Patents,
supra note 30.
32
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1952); see also General Information Concerning
Patents, supra note 30.
33
See Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
34
See id. at 9; see also infra Section I.c, f.
35
See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790).
36
See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7.
37
Id. at 6–7.
38
See id. at 9.
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inventors should be entitled to some benefit for contributing to the
public knowledge, he tempered his concern by deciding that
patents should be granted pursuant to a high bar of patentability.39
Jefferson recognized that in doing so, the Patent Office would need
to articulate “a line between the things which are worth to the
public . . . an exclusive patent, and those which are not,” 40 thus
foreshadowing the critical, modern issue of patent eligibility.
In 1952, the patent system was revised to consider novelty,
utility, and nonobviousness as part of the patent eligibility formulation. 41 It should not come as a surprise that analysis of these
elements was difficult at times, especially within the scientific
fields that patents are often associated with, such as pharmaceuticals, engineering, and chemical compounds. Courts would, for
example, have to consider what might be obvious or novel about a
particular synthesized biochemical molecule. At least one of the
above elements, obviousness, is considered in light of what a person having ordinary skill in the art (also referred to as PHOSITA),
a legal fiction similar to the reasonably prudent man from torts,
might know.42 If patent eligibility was therefore being determined
in part by standards that on their face could seem a bit nebulous,
some degree of variation among the regional courts of appeals
would be expected, in addition to the further variation expected
from the more numerous district judges considering each element
at the trial level.
In this pre-Federal Circuit version of the U.S. patent system,
the strength and value of this exclusive property right, bestowed by
the federal government, often based on relatively technical art, and
judged by something of an abstract standard, would consequently
vary depending on the circuit in which the property right was being
asserted.43 There simply existed a “notorious difference between
39

See id. at 8–9.
See id. at 9.
41
See id. at 12; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (1952).
42
See 35 U.S.C. § 103; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 2141 Examination Guidelines
for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 [R-08.2017] (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2141.html
[https://perma.cc/QK2VJDET].
43
See George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has It
Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
40
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the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the [regional circuit] courts”44 and it needed to be corrected if uniformity for a nationally recognized right was to be established. A fact-finding
commission was subsequently ordered to devise possible courses
of action.45 Given the public’s fear of a specialized appellate court
taking too much control over a particular jurisprudence, one commission member proposed that they overcome the hostility with a
merger of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 46 These Courts already handled numerous patent
cases while retaining jurisdiction over subject matters as well, so
the contention was that they would be perfect tribunals for the
assignment of patent matters.47 This proposal gained traction and
eventually emerged as the core of the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982.48
The formation of the Federal Circuit would prove a boon for
the patent law community by designating a single circuit to consolidate the jurisprudences of the assorted regional courts and beginning the construction of uniform patent law precedent for practitioners to follow. Assisting in this task was a relatively laissezfaire Supreme Court.49 For the first fifteen years of the new court’s
existence, the Supreme Court reviewed fewer than ten Federal
Circuit decisions,50 allowing the new expert court to develop its
new unified jurisprudence with minimal intrusion.

671, 677–78, 680 (2011); see also, e.g., Reports of the Committee on Patents, N.Y.C.
BAR 2 (July 2015), https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072952-SHOULD
PATENTJURISDICTIONBEREMOVEDFROMTHEJURISDICTIONOFTHEFEDERA
LCIRCUITANDRETURNEDTOREGIONALCOURTSOFAPPEAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4V5-DLR8] [hereinafter NYC Bar Report].
44
See NYC Bar Report, supra note 43, at 2 (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 18).
45
See Beighley Jr., supra note 43, at 683–89.
46
See id. at 689–90.
47
See id.
48
See id. at 690, 699; see also History of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, https://federalcircuithistoricalsociety.org/history
ofcourt.html [https://perma.cc/3HP3-GH5E].
49
See Roy Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of
Appeals, AM. BAR n.13 (Jan. 2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan2010_Hofer.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D646-6GFZ].
50
See id.

2020]

FIDDLING WITH FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

947

Arguably the greatest beneficiaries from this new court and its
stable jurisprudence were innovators in what are generally thought
of as patent intensive industries: fields that rely heavily on
proprietary products and designs to effectively compete such as
computer hardware, electronic components, and pharmaceuticals.51
In the present day, these industries have approximate global market
values of $370 billion,52 $332 billion,53 and $934 billion,54 respectively. Because their intellectual property could very well be freely
misappropriated, entities in these patent-intensive fields would
likely not be able to compete as effectively without a potent patent
system with which to safeguard their proprietary information, and
the entities themselves would then be arguably less incentivized to
innovate.55
The Federal Circuit proceeded to also simplify several of the
standards and tests governing patent law within their new, uniform
jurisprudence. By drawing up bright-line rules for patent cases, the
Federal Circuit could simplify patent litigation for district courts

51

See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S.
ECONOMY INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS 8 (Mar. 2012), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z89-8PJA].
52
Computer Hardware Global Market Report 2019, BUS. RES. CO. (Jan. 2019),
https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com/report/computer-hardware-global-marketreport [https://perma.cc/8P4K-5TEP].
53
Active Electronic Components 2018 Global Market Net Worth US $332.20 Billion
Forecast by 2022, MKT. WATCH (Dec. 10, 2018, 11:17 AM), https://www.market
watch.com/press-release/active-electronic-components-2018-global-market-net-worth-us33220-billion-forecast-by-2022-2018-12-10 [https://perma.cc/8D4G-27P2].
54
The Growing Pharmaceutical Market: Expert Forecasts and Analysis, MKT. RES.
(May 16, 2018), https://blog.marketresearch.com/the-growing-pharmaceuticals-marketexpert-forecasts-and-analysis [https://perma.cc/9H9D-GC7A].
55
Though there is some disagreement as to the thinking that the granting of property
rights promotes innovation, there is adequate analysis to suggest the general axiom is
true. See generally Zorina Khan & Kenneth Sokoloff, Schemes of Practical Utility:
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Among “Great Investors” in the United States, 1790–
1865, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (1992); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY
(2003), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promoteinnovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X57W-YX3L]; David Kline, Do Patents Really Promote Innovation?,
MICHELSON INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 24, 2017), https://michelsonip.com/patentsreally-promote-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/ZMC6-RVHD].
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by making legal determinations more straightforward.56 The Federal Circuit therein began cementing the norms of patent litigation
procedure in such a way that patent holders could be more confident in the validity of their patent, not having to worry as much
about uncertainty within the law later invalidating said patent.57
This was particularly useful with regard to patent eligibility.
Arguably one of the most important issues when discussing the
prevailing uncertainties in patent law, eligibility is the very basis
upon which a petitioner can procure a patent.58 Just as Thomas Jefferson was concerned about what type of high bar of patentability
should apply in the early days of the Republic,59 patent applicants
today still consider the very same question.60 After the creation of
the Federal Circuit, patent applicants could breathe a little easier
knowing that interpretation of the critical patent eligibility statute
was left to a single circuit centered around the idea of patent specialization. Consequently, until 1997, the Federal Circuit seemed
well-grounded and patent precedent was sufficiently stable.61
B. The Supreme Court’s Newfound Interest and Effect of Its
Reversals
The second fifteen years of the Federal Circuit’s existence,
however, saw a sharp reversal in the relatively minimal oversight
that the specialized appellate court had so far enjoyed. In contrast
to the Federal Circuit’s early years, the fifteen year period between
1997 and 2012 saw roughly twenty patent cases taken up by the
Supreme Court, three times what was reviewed between 1982 and

56

See Steven Seidenburg, Tug-of-War Over Interpretations of Patent Law Continues
Between Federal Circuit and SCOTUS, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tug_of_war_over_interpretations_of_patent_law_
continues_between_federal [https://perma.cc/B377-HLAN]; see also David Forman, Why
Does the U.S. Supreme Court Keep Reversing the Federal Circuit?, OSHA LIANG
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://oshaliang.com/newsletter/why-does-the-u-s-supreme-court-keepreversing-the-federal-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/9ZX4-C7TW].
57
See generally sources cited supra note 56.
58
See generally 34 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
59
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1966).
60
See infra Sections II.d–e.
61
See infra Section I.b.
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1997. 62 While the Court had seemingly left the Federal Circuit
alone in the early years to develop its technical acumen and create
uniformity in the patent law, the Supreme Court’s frequent interpretation in patent cases between 1997 and 2012 reflects a concern
that the lower court had gone too far in specializing the law and
strayed away from the general principles that govern all law.63 One
could look at such a reaction as an attempt to meld the general
body of law and its focus on justice and equity with the clear, specific principles of Federal Circuit jurisprudence developed to emphasize certainty over traditional equity.
As mentioned previously, since 1997, the Supreme Court has
steadily taken on more appeals from the Federal Circuit. 64 Although the proportionally smaller Federal Circuit reviews only a
slight fraction of all the federal appeal filings in the nation—1,528
cases or 2.98% of all federal appeal filings in 2017—its decisions
are more frequently taking up a larger, disproportionate amount of
space on the Supreme Court’s docket.65 In 2016, appeals from the
Federal Circuit comprised 14% of the high court’s docket.66 The
clear takeaway is that the Supreme Court is now willing to be more
hands-on with the Federal Circuit.
This newfound willingness to review patent decisions more
frequently and to bring patent jurisprudence in line with the
general law has consequently led to numerous important tenets of
patent law being reversed 67 and, in turn, weakening the patent
system.68 This includes issues such as patent eligibility, the fundamental right to exclude, the strength of patent rights overseas, and
62
See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Michael Risch & Camilla Hrdy, Supreme Court
Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patentsscotus.html [https://perma.cc/4WZK-LSSV].
63
See Seidenburg, supra note 56; see also Andrew Chung, Supreme Court and Top
Patent Court Rarely See Eye to Eye, REUTERS (June 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-court-patents/supreme-court-and-top-patent-court-rarely-see-eye-to-eyeidUSKBN19A34I [https://perma.cc/CM8J-V9E9].
64
See Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: The Heightened Importance of the Federal
Circuit, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/12/empiricalscotus-the-heightened-importance-of-the-federal-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/N5J7-EQGW].
65
See id.
66
See id.
67
See generally infra Section III.
68
See generally infra Section III.
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more.69 This conclusion that the system is weakening is also not
one reached solely by practitioners, but by former judicial figures
as well. Former Chief Judge Paul Michel of the Federal Circuit,
who retired in 2010, reflected that the “patent system has been
weakened, and as far as [I am] concerned the Supreme Court is
unaware of that.”70
This trend of reversals and subsequent weakening of the
overall system has in fact benefited some parties, particularly
companies that are frequent targets of non-practicing entities71—
colloquially known as “patent trolls.”72 Judge Michel opined that
American commerce as a whole is bound to be negatively impacted by this trend, resulting in the diminished certainty of patent
rights, in turn leading to hesitancy in further investment, scaled
back research, and reduced innovation, 73 a prediction that has
more or less already come to fruition.74
The Global Innovation Policy Center (“GIPC”), a self-reported
affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 75 began releasing
annual assessments of IP law in the United States relative to foreign nations in 2012.76 In its 2016 edition, the United States was
tied for first place with regard to the overall quality of its patent

69

See generally infra Section III.
Chung, supra note 63.
71
See id.
72
The term “patent troll” generally refers to a person or commercial entity that holds
one or more patents, but engages in very little, if any, actual commerce with it. See
Dennis Crouch, What Is a Patent Troll and Why Are They Bad?, PATENTLYO (Mar. 6,
2009),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/what-is-a-troll-patent-and-why-are-theybad.html [https://perma.cc/WA8Q-XHJ3]. The troll instead asserts the patent(s) against
other commercial entities who often are not infringing directly or even at all with the goal
of negotiating a license agreement. See id. The size of the entity the trolls makes
assertions against and the degree to which the patent invention is a part of the larger
entity’s business are significant factors in a troll’s decision of who to assert the patent
against. See id.
73
See Chung, supra note 63.
74
See sources cited supra note 25 (confirming the general, downward trend of the U.S.
patent system as diminishing in strength and quality relative to foreign jurisdictions).
75
Global Innovation Policy Center, GIPC, https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/
[https://perma.cc/62NR-LVVX].
76
See generally Global Innovation Policy Index, KAUFMAN FOUND. (Mar. 2012),
http://www2.itif.org/2012-global-innovation-policy-index.pdf?_ga=2.92510557.
175042246.1570140631-1533524264.1570140631 [https://perma.cc/XK3H-ZX39].
70
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system, scoring 6.5 out of a possible 7 points, along with the United Kingdom (“UK”), Switzerland, Sweden, Singapore, Germany,
and France.77 However, the GIPC’s assessment of the U.S. patent
system fell to tenth place in 2017 by scoring 7 points out of a possible 8, tying with Hungary.78 It subsequently fell again in 2018 to
twelfth place, tying Italy with 7.25 out of a possible 8.79 In reviewing this subjective ranking, it is worth noting that although other
publications have questioned the GIPC’s methodology as flawed
by utilizing vague criteria to convey a narrative desired by a special interest group to justify patent reform,80 it remains useful in at
least illustrating the global IP stage in the aggregate. From this perspective, one can identify the underlying areas of the U.S. patent
system that have declined in quality as a forum to assert IP rights
relative to other nations.81
China, as an example, has seemingly embraced several areas of
patentable material that the United States has avoided in granting
patents, such as software and business method patents.82 By combining this broader scope of patentability, a 90% probability of a
patent owner securing injunctive relief in an infringement case
where there has been a finding of infringement,83 and a specialized,
fast-tracked court specifically for patents, 84 it is understandable
that China is growing into a hotbed for innovation. Whereas an av77

See U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX27 (2016),
https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/GIPC_Index_Report_
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCB4-8B8Q].
78
See 2017 IP INDEX, supra note 25, at 117.
79
See 2018 IP INDEX, supra note 25, at 35.
80
See Richard Lloyd, IP Index Showing Decline in the US Patent System Lacks
Credibility, Claims Unified COO, IAM (June 8, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/lawpolicy/ip-index-showing-decline-us-patent-system-lacks-credibility-claims-unified-coo
[https://perma.cc/NZA8-UMCT].
81
See generally Quinn, supra note 7; New, supra note 26 (wherein the Secretariat of
the World Intellectual Property Organization found the United States to still be the world
leader in IP law, but suffering a decline in its overall scores from the previous year);
Gene Quinn, Iancu: USPTO Guidance Gets 101 Right; Time for Courts to Follow Suit,
IP WATCHDOG (May 7, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/07/iancu-usptoguidance-gets-101-right-time-courts-follow-suit/id=109015/
[https://perma.cc/WSL2SJE7][hereinafter Quinn, Iancu].
82
See Madigan, supra note 21.
83
See id.
84
See Morinville & Fokas, supra note 21.
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erage patent litigation case in the United States can often cost over
$3 million over the course of five or more years, the specialized
patent courts in China can resolve a dispute for around $200,000 in
less than a year.85
Even though American companies are on record as disliking
how disputes in China often require a transfer of patent rights to
their Chinese affiliates, it is arguably worthwhile given that injunctive relief was granted in approximately 100% of patent infringement actions filed in China by foreign firms when there was a
finding of infringement as opposed to patent litigation in the
United States where infringement is far more likely to be met with
only a compulsory licensing fee.86 Accordingly, while China reaps
the benefits of this attractive patent venue, the continued weakening of the U.S. system has resulted in a reported 62% decrease in
venture capital investments.87
To offer one additional point of reference as to a measure of a
patent system’s strength, a brief look at the European continent is
in order. The European Union (“EU”), the political bloc of more
than two dozen European countries which include some of the
world’s largest commercial markets like Germany and France, is in
the process of implementing a Unified Patent Court (“UPC”), a
forum wherein litigants can assert claims from patents granted by
the European Patent Office in a common court with jurisdiction
over all Member States.88 Meant to preside over all EU patent disputes with a uniform jurisprudence of law and comparatively easy
access to injunctive relief with the means to efficiently enforce
rulings across the bloc,89 a constitutional challenge in Germany is
the only remaining impediment to the UPC’s implementation. 90
85

See id.
See id.
87
See id.
88
See generally Agreement on a Unified Patent Court20 June 2013, 2013 O.J. (C 175),
https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:175:0001:0040:EN:PDF
[https://perma.cc/SZ8E-T674].
89
See generally id.
90
See Vincent Look, What to Know in the Lead-Up to Brexit and the Unitary Patent
System, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/04/10/knowlead-brexit-unitary-patent-system/id=108135/ [https://perma.cc/T4ME-23RW].
86
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Although the departure of the UK from the bloc on January 31,
2020 pursuant to the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement 91 could also
complicate implementation, the UK had already ratified the UPC
agreement in April 2018.92 Since then, the UK has not expressly
indicated any intent to withdraw, a stance that head of the Preparatory Committee for the UPC Alexander Ramsay sees as permitting
the implementation of the UPC with the UK as a contracting state
under treaty law, not EU law.93 Should that eventuality occur, a
favorable decision from the German constitutional court would
thereby pave the way for a single forum in which to address patent
disputes across a massive geographical market and in a far more
efficient manner than the U.S. system in its current state. Taken in
the aggregate, these streamlined procedures and specialized venues
present further evidence that the U.S. patent system is becoming
less efficient and desirable for enforcing patent rights.94
91

See Jill Lawless, After Brexit: UK Leaves EU but What’s Next Far from
Certain, ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 31, 2020), https://apnews.com/d0a718b09516c6610746773e
7a4bcfd3 [https://perma.cc/YQ58-RJVH].
92
See Alan Johnson, UK Ratifies the UPC Agreement, BRISTOWS (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.bristowsupc.com/latest-news/uk-ratifies-the-upc-agreement
[https://perma.cc/4W8L-EYTH].
93
See Unified Patent Court Could Start in Early 2021—With UK, PATENT- UND
RECHTSANWALTSKANZLEI (Dec. 2, 2019), https://legal-patent.com/patent-law/unifiedpatent-court-could-start-in-early-2021-with-uk/ [https://perma.cc/4QJJ-7GF5]; see also
Amy Sandys, The UPC Will Be Operational in Early 2021, JUVE-PATENT (Nov. 28,
2019), https://www.juve-patent.com/news-and-stories/people-and-business/the-upc-willbe-operational-in-early-2021/ [https://perma.cc/86M8-WFTP].
94
In the week immediately prior to this Note’s publication, well after it had
originally been drafted, the United Kingdom reversed its intention of participating in the
UPC system following Brexit. The UK formally left the EU on January 31, 2020,
pursuant to the recently passed Brexit Withdrawal Agreement, and soon thereafter
published on February 27, 2020 a series of guidelines it intended to utilize during its
negotiations with the EU to establish post-Brexit relations. See OFFICE OF THE PRIME
MINISTER, THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU, CP211, ¶¶ 1–3 (UK). In particular,
the British government stated that it would “not agree to any obligation for [UK] laws to
be aligned with the EU’s, or for the EU’s institutions, including the Court of Justice, to
have any jurisdiction in the UK.” See id. at ¶ 5. A spokesman for the British government
later confirmed that “the UK [would] not be seeking involvement in the [UPC] system”
as doing so would be “inconsistent with [the government’s] aims of becoming an
independent self-governing nation.” See Joff Wild, The UK Will Not Be Part of the
UPC, Government Confirms to IAM, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MGMT. (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.iammedia.com/law-policy/uk-no-upc
[https://perma.cc/7S3Y-HACP].
Although this recent reversal leaves the future of the UPC in question, it does not
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It is therefore clear that there are other attractive forums around
the world besides the United States in which global innovators can
invest, not only with relatively more efficient venues in which to
address disputes, but also with a higher probability of a favorable
outcome. The increasing appeal of these forums abroad will only
continue to surpass that of the United States so long as the U.S.
patent system remains mired in uncertainty and precedent reversals. To counteract this detracting force and reassert confidence in
the U.S. system, it becomes imperative to craft remedial measures
that fully address the current disagreements in jurisprudence
between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit since these
disputes give rise to legal uncertainty, undermining the U.S. patent
system as a whole.
II. PATENTLY SHOCKING CHANGES
Although all Supreme Court decisions on patent law by nature
will invariably have an impact on the patent system, some cases in
particular produce more dynamic changes than others. The following cases, chosen to illustrate key changes in patent law, demonstrate instances since 1997 when the Supreme Court reversed
a decision of the Federal Circuit and caused a shift in the practice
of patent law severe enough that it ultimately influenced overall
commercial strategy in the United States. In selecting these specific patent cases from the high court, this Note focuses on decisions that altered a critical part of U.S. patent litigation, commercial ownership, or the fundamental concept of patentability.
A. The Right to Exclude Is Significantly Impaired—eBay (2006)
Arguably the first case since the inception of the Federal Circuit to really upend U.S. patent jurisprudence and diminish confidence therein, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC 95 altered the fun-

diminish the reality that implementation of this unified court, which would permit the
uniform adjudication of patent claims across dozens of countries with more efficient
remedies, was arguably imminent and only disrupted on account of wider trade
negotiations. Accordingly, this recent setback should not be seen as diminishing the
importance of the U.S. patent system’s decline.
95
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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damental ability of a patent holder to exclude others from using
patented material by discarding the Federal Circuit’s liberal grants
of injunctive relief and replacing it instead with the traditional
four-factor test of equity used in injunction disputes outside of patent law.96
The case began when MercExchange, a non-practicing entity,
retained a portfolio of patents and asserted several against eBay, a
well-known online auction site that allows users to sell and buy
goods amongst each other.97 One of the asserted patents was U.S.
Patent No. 5,845,265, a business method patent covering the consignment of goods in a computerized market, a key aspect of
eBay’s platform.98 A jury trial subsequently found the patent valid
and that eBay had infringed it, whereupon the district court judge
granted an award of damages but denied MercExchange’s request
for injunctive relief.99 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court, stating that “the general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged” since the “right to exclude recognized in a patent is but
the essence of the concept of property,” and in fact cited its own
sixteen-year-old precedent to further emphasize the existence of
the general rule.100 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the public interest or other compelling reasons could justify a trial judge
exercising discretion within the bounds of 35 U.S.C. § 283 and
denying permanent injunction relief, but found no such reason to
do so in the eBay dispute.101
On review, the Supreme Court evaluated and discarded this
bright-line test, explaining that neither the district court nor the
Federal Circuit properly applied “traditional equitable principles”
96

See id. at 393–94.
See id. at 390.
98
See id.; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265.
99
eBay, 547 U.S. at 390–91.
100
See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
101
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94 (citing MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339); see also 35
U.S.C. § 283 (1952) (“Injunction—The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under
this title [35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.] may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of
equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court
deems reasonable.”) (emphasis added).
97
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by considering whether “(1) [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”102 In
overruling the Federal Circuit’s general rule of granting permanent
injunctions liberally, the Supreme Court inherently diminished one
of the most fundamental aspects of a patent holder’s rights: the
ability to exclude.
By firmly tying a district court’s ability to grant injunctive
relief to the traditional four-factor test, the commonly perceived
adequacy of monetary damages to remedy infringement routinely
precludes permanent injunctive relief.103 Moreover, the availability
and relatively straightforward calculations of monetary damages in
such cases, often where businesses keep extensive records of
financial figures and have already considered licensing terms
internally, has effectively created what is in some ways a compulsory licensing system.104 For example, if half of a company’s business depends on an infringed patent, then half of that company’s
revenue could be awarded as adequate damages. While this relief
may satisfy ordinary notions of equity, the patent owner’s fundamental right to exclude has still been severely abridged.

102

See MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 391, 393. Further, the Supreme Court commented
on the lower court’s remarks about a party’s “lack of commercial activity in practicing
the patents” and found that such a factor may be used in consideration of the four-factor
test[] but is not dispositive alone. Id. at 393.
103
Compare S.O.I.TEC Silicon On Insulator Techs., S.A. v. MEMC Elec. Materials,
Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76169 (D. Del. July 13, 2011) (wherein injunctive relief was
denied upon finding total damages could conceivably be satisfied with monetary
damages), with Evonik Degussa Gmbh v. Materia, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126909
(D. Del. Aug. 9, 2017) (granting injunctive relief where a competitive relationship
between the parties and an absolute unwillingness to license the subject patent satisfied
the eBay test).
104
See R. David Donoghue Will eBay v. MercExchange Lead to Compulsory
Licensing?, CHI. IP LITIG. (Jan. 21, 2008), https://www.chicagoiplitigation.com/2008/01/
will-ebay-v-mercexchange-lead-to-compulsory-licensing/
[https://perma.cc/GE2TMJYF].
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As noted already,105 a U.S. patent at its core is a grant of exclusive property rights from the U.S. government in exchange for innovation that benefits the public; of these property rights, the most
important right is the right to exclude in order to effectuate the
temporary monopoly that the Founders originally intended. 106 In
restricting a patentee’s ability to exclude, the Supreme Court took
the first step in weakening the U.S. patent system by severely
hampering access to a remedy integral to the fundamental benefit
that incentivizes so many innovators and inventors to seek a patent
in the first place.107 This shortfall is made all the more glaring in
light of foreign jurisdictions now promoting easier access to the
same remedy.108 Consequently, eBay is viewed by many as the first
of many recent harmful decisions by the high court.109
B. Predictability Bleeds into the Test for Obviousness—KSR
(2007)
The next major shock to the U.S. patent system came a year
after eBay, when the Supreme Court took up review of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,110 a case involving obviousness. In
this dispute, Teleflex was the holder of U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565
B1, an adjustable pedal assembly with electronic throttle control.111
The patent invention comprised an adjustable automobile pedal
with a mounted electronic sensor that fed data about the pedal’s
position to a processor that controlled the throttle of a vehicle’s
engine.112 Teleflex asserted this patent against its competitor KSR
whose pedal Teleflex believed to infringe its patent. 113 Arguing
that Teleflex’s patent was merely the combination of two pieces
of prior art, one comprising an adjustable pedal and another com105

See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).
107
See supra Section I.b.
108
See supra Section I.b.
109
See Gene Quinn, Seeds of Demise Were Sown When SCOTUS Removed Exclusivity
from the Patent Bargain, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2018/09/19/seeds-demise-scotus-removed-exclusivity-patent-bargain/id=101492/
[https://perma.cc/Z4HN-94EQ].
110
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
111
See id. at 405–06; see also U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 B1.
112
See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406.
113
See id. at 411–12.
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prising a means of mounting a sensor atop a pedal, KSR disputed
this alleged infringement.114
At trial, the district court granted summary judgment for KSR
and followed the test for obviousness laid out in Graham115 to find
that Teleflex’s patent was indeed a simple combination of the prior
art. 116 The district court proceeded to then utilize the teachingsuggestion-motivation (“TSM”) test required by Federal Circuit
precedent wherein validity is determined based on whether there
existed any suggestion or motivation to combine prior art into the
present invention.117 Although the district court found that the prior
art offered sufficient motivation to combine prior elements into the
present claim, the Federal Circuit later reversed the grant of summary judgment and held that the TSM test was improperly applied
because the district court had failed to make specific findings as to
any suggestion or motivation to attach a sensor to a pedal.118
The Supreme Court, on review, again reversed the Federal Circuit, this time ruling that the Federal Circuit had placed too much
emphasis on the TSM test and that a narrow application of the test
was incongruous with the high court’s precedent in Graham.119 In
applying the TSM test in such a rigid manner, the Federal Circuit
had apparently omitted the emphasis on a “functional approach” as
stated in Graham. 120 Though the Court’s ultimate ruling on the
matter of obviousness more or less reiterated what Graham had set
forth fifty years prior,121 it also constituted an apparent admonition
of the Federal Circuit’s preference for bright-line rules. No longer
would obviousness rely on a singular test, but would now instead
be considered in light of numerous rationales, later articulated in

114

See id.
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (requiring courts determining
obviousness to consider (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences
between the present invention and the prior art; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the
art).
116
See KSR, 550 U.S. at 413.
117
See id. at 413.
118
See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. App’x 282, 286–88 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
119
See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.
120
See id.
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See id. at 426–27.
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USPTO examiner guidelines compliant with KSR.122 The problem
here, though, is that this Supreme Court reversal again created new
uncertainty in U.S. patent law.
Whether the TSM test was too rigidly applied or not in this particular case, it was a single, clear test with which an inventor could
consider their invention and decide whether pursuing a patent was
worthwhile. Prior to KSR, if the inventor considered the TSM test
carefully and was honest in assessing the novelty of their own
invention, they could be relatively confident as to whether it would
pass a scrutiny of obviousness and be considered valid. 123 The
Supreme Court’s ruling in KSR thus created additional uncertainty
which further diminished the strength of the overall patent system
by no longer utilizing a clear, bright-line test in § 103 obviousness
inquiries.
C. Limiting the Effectiveness of Exhaustion Agreements in Patent
License Agreements–Quanta (2008)
It again took just one year after its last splash for the Supreme
Court to review and overturn additional patent precedent, this time
in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. with the patent
exhaustion doctrine.124 Here, LG was the owner of several patents
covering microprocessor chips for use in computing, as well as
additional method patents covering the usage of said chips. 125
When it licensed these patents to Intel, LG stipulated in a separate
agreement that the license did not cover any products made by
combining LG chips with non-LG or non-Intel components and
required Intel to give its customers notice of this stipulation. 126
This allowed LG to later assert a conceivable claim to try and collect royalties from any of Intel’s buyers who subsequently utilized

122

See 2141 Examination Guidelines, supra note 42.
See Tina Hulse, Esther Lim & Ningling Wang, Implications of KSR in Prosecution
and Litigation: The Standard of Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, MANAGING INTELL.
PROP. (Mar. 2008), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/implications-of-ksr-inprosecution-and-litigation-the-standard.html [https://perma.cc/NF2X-GADN].
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553 U.S. 617, 621 (2007).
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See id.
126
See id. at 623–24.
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the licensed chips. 127 Accordingly, when Quanta purchased licensed chips from Intel, Intel gave the requisite notice and Quanta
proceeded to manufacture its computers for sale in such a way that
infringed LG’s method patents.128
In the ensuing litigation, the district court granted summary
judgment to Quanta and found that LG’s license agreement with
Intel invoked the exhaustion doctrine129 wherein an authorized sale
exhausts all patent rights in that item, applying this doctrine to the
physical chips but not the method claims.130 The Federal Circuit
agreed with regard to the inapplicability of the doctrine to method
claims, though the court cited its own precedent in finding that vertical restraint clauses in patent licenses were permissible.131 Upon
review, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s ruling
and found that Intel’s authorized sale of the chips, a patented
component that had no reasonable non-infringing use, triggered
exhaustion since LG was unable to suggest any use for the chips
that did not in some way practice LG’s method patents.132
The ruling in Quanta, though not as impactful on the patent
landscape as a whole like eBay or KSR, still imposed a significant
restriction on the ability of patent holders to retain control of their
patented matter through contract. Though post-sale restraints on
the sale of actual, patented products were already fairly restricted, 133 restrictions on the application of method claims had been
less than clear. Now, even where express, agreed-upon terms are
set forth in the license agreement, patent holders still relinquish
more control of their innovations than was previously permissible.

127

See Hana Bae & Courtney Zanocco, Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics: Supreme
Court Bulletin, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/06937 [https://perma.cc/PP3X-X34U].
128
See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 624.
129
See id. at 625 (“[The] doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”).
130
See id. at 624–25.
131
See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Vertical restraint clauses refer to express conditions set forth in sale agreements or
licenses that limit the rights conferred upon the licensee. See id.; see also Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
132
See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 631.
133
See generally Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
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This additional erosion of a patentee’s rights further diminishes the
value of a U.S. patent by limiting the desirable commercial licensing opportunities available.
D. Natural Phenomena and Diagnostic Methods Involving
Natural Phenomena Deemed Ineligible for Patent Protection—
Mayo, Myriad (2012–13)
The next major change from the Supreme Court came in 2012
with Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc.134 and in 2013 with Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc.135 Both cases involved multiple trips to the
Supreme Court and both cases resulted in reversals of previously
stable Federal Circuit precedent.
In Mayo, Prometheus Labs owned a pair of diagnostic method
patents consisting of steps taken to determine an appropriate dosage of medication.136 Specifically, they involved taking unpatentable natural laws like the relationship between metabolites and the
efficacy of a pharmaceutical drug 137 and creating a patentable
method by describing how one determines a dosage for an autoimmune condition, first by administering a reactive drug to the
patient and then by measuring the overall presence of the drug to
compute an appropriate dosage.138
In Myriad, Myriad Genetics secured several patents after isolating the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—genetic mutations linked to
a heightened risk of breast and ovarian cancers—and subsequently
determining their exact location and sequence. 139 These patents,
if valid, would permit Myriad to exclude others from isolating this
important gene, as well as excluding others from producing synthetic BRCA genes.140
Both cases involved challenges to patents on § 101 patent eligibility grounds. The Prometheus patent was challenged as failing
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

See 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012).
See 569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013).
See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 74–75.
See id. at 77.
See id. at 74–75.
See Myriad, 569 U.S. at 583.
See id. at 585.
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to substantially transform a law of nature and the Myriad patent
was challenged as claiming a natural phenomenon.141 The respective district courts found in favor of the challengers in both cases,
invalidating the subject patents as ineligible.142 With regard to the
claims about patenting what were arguably natural laws, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower courts in both cases. In Mayo, the
Federal Circuit found that the claims consisted of more than “data
gathering” by claiming multiple transformations inherent to the
process wherein the administration of a drug caused a qualifying
change in the patient, followed by a physical measurement to
gauge the first transformation. 143 In Myriad, the Federal Circuit
similarly opined that there was sufficient transformation to satisfy
patent eligibility as isolated genes outside of the body should be
considered chemically different from genes in their natural state, in
keeping with USPTO policy.144
The Mayo case went up to the Supreme Court while Myriad
was still being decided, but both were originally vacated and remanded for further consideration: Mayo to be reconsidered in light
of Bilski v. Kappos, 145 which found that the machine-transformation test was not to be used as the sole means of determining
whether a process is patentable, and Myriad to be considered in
light of the first Supreme Court review of Mayo.146 When the Federal Circuit reviewed both cases on remand, it remained steadfast
and asserted that the claims in both cases were still patentable.147
Both cases were then again submitted for further review by the Supreme Court and review was granted in both instances.148

141

See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–76; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 586.
See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–76; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 583.
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See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
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See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 589.
148
See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012); Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576
(2013).
142

2020]

FIDDLING WITH FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

963

In Mayo, the Supreme Court held that the diagnostic procedures present, given that they involved unpatentable laws of
nature, were not sufficiently transformative to qualify for patent
eligibility as Prometheus had simply written “instructions [that]
add nothing specific to the laws of nature[.]”149 A similar disposition followed in Myriad a year later when a second Supreme Court
review found that the mere act of isolating DNA was also not sufficiently transformative. 150 The Federal Circuit had originally
asserted that there was sufficient transformation when a DNA
strand’s covalent bonds were severed, the end molecule thus
undergoing a qualifying change to constitute a transformation.151
On review, the Supreme Court found that mere isolation is not
transformative enough to warrant the patenting of natural genes,
though it did provide that an artificial alteration of natural genes,
such as cDNA, would remain eligible for a patent.152
The full effect of Mayo and Myriad would not be felt until a
year later when Alice completed the trio of cases that collectively
threw the understood idea of modern patent eligibility out the window. 153 Mayo and Myriad, however, were sufficient to prompt
immediate doubt from several of the more prominent industries
like bio-research and diagnostics, also calling into question the validity of many patents in these fields.154 The actual valuations of
patents in these fields consequently dropped simply by existing in
a grey area as innovators and buyers of patents recognized that patents in these fields were more likely to be invalidated at some
point in the future given a post-grant review, even without formal
adjudication as to validity.155 This quantitative measure of uncertainty, total change in valuation, was the result of risk-adjusted
present value—i.e., the estimated change in worth of a commodity
149

See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82.
See Myriad, 569 U.S. at 586–87.
151
See id.
152
See id. at 593–95.
153
See infra Section III.e.
154
See Sean Sheridan, How Mayo, Myriad and Alice May Impact Patent Valuations,
CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/
publications/How-Mayo-Myriad-And-Alice-May-Impact-Patent-Valuations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WC4Z-ZUPV].
155
See id.
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given assorted factors related to its market—and is a somewhat
tangible measure of how the U.S. patent system was changing.156
Mayo and Myriad arguably best exemplify the concerns of
legal practitioners who worry that the Federal Circuit too often gets
stuck down “in the technical weeds” rather than considering the
“broader legal and policy implications,” a consideration that possibly leads to increased review by the Supreme Court.157
E. Mass Invalidation of “Abstract Idea” Patents—Alice (2014)
Alice Corps. v. CLS Bank International,158 together with eBay,
are arguably the two cases most responsible for weakening the
U.S. patent system as a whole given that they ushered in two of the
most sweeping changes. At the heart of Alice was a business method patent related to managing financial risk using a “computerimplemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ (i.e., the risk
that only one party to a financial transaction will pay what it
owes) . . . .” 159 The method patent centered around the use of a
computer as an intermediary to create “shadow” credit and debit
records, which were regularly updated with the real-life records of
transacting parties.160 The system subsequently relied on the computer records to act as a gatekeeper for transactions as a whole and
only allowed transactions when the shadow records contained sufficient funds to properly process a transaction.161
CLS Bank, an operator of global transaction services, sought a
declaratory judgment of non-infringement from the courts while
the Alice Corporation asserted that CLS had infringed its patent.162
Siding with CLS, the district court found that the claims were invalid because “they [were] directed to the abstract idea of ‘employing
a neutral intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obli156

Id.
See Krista Cox, Oracle v. Google Is More Evidence the Federal Circuit Has No
Business Deciding Copyright Cases, ABOVE L. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/
2018/03/oracle-v-google-is-more-evidence-that-the-federal-circuit-has-no-businessdeciding-copyright-cases/ [https://perma.cc/ZBE7-6VN8].
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573 U.S. 208 (2014).
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See id. at 212.
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gations in order to minimize risk.’” 163 Upon first review by the
Federal Circuit, the three-judge panel ruled 2–1 and reversed the
district court’s invalidation, finding that Alice’s claims were sufficiently directed toward patentable subject matter.164 However, the
Federal Circuit agreed to hear the case again en banc, this time
reversing the earlier panel and affirming the original invalidation
by the district court by a five judge plurality.165 The en banc panel
was split with seven opinions written in total.166 However, by recognizing that invalidation at the appellate level was inappropriate
as it would likely lead to “retroactively invalidat[ing] tens of thousands of . . . patents” given the abstract nature of many patents,
particularly software, the dissent of Circuit Judges O’Malley and
Linn would eventually prove prophetic. 167 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and the premonition about mass invalidation
would essentially be proven right.
One year after the en banc Federal Circuit rehearing, the
Supreme Court held the claims of Alice’s patent to be ineligible as
they simply directed an abstract idea like risk management to a
generic intermediary like a computer.168 Had the case been left at
the Federal Circuit, Alice’s patent would have been invalidated and
other abstract idea patents could conceivably presume validity until
directly challenged given that there was no majority opinion from
the Federal Circuit to follow. However, because the Supreme
Court issued an opinion, the patent system as a whole experienced
an abrupt upheaval as Justice Thomas formally set out a test for
adjudging abstract validity, taken from Mayo.169 In matters involving claims of abstract ideas, the Supreme Court directed that courts
first determine whether the subject claim contains an abstract idea
like a computer code or implementation.170 If the claimed matter
does not contain any abstract ideas, it may be patentable on its

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

See id. (internal citations omitted).
See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corps., 685 F.3d 1341, 1352–56 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corps., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1333.
See id.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
See id. at 217.
See id.
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own.171 If there is an abstract idea involved in the claim, the court
directed that some “new and useful” application of the abstract
idea must be present to qualify as patent eligible, such that there’s
an “inventive concept.”172
In delivering this landmark opinion, however, it is imperative
to note that the Supreme Court decided that it “need not labor to
delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category [of patents],” effectively leaving the question wide open for the district
courts and Federal Circuit to sort out.173 This task would hardly
prove an easy one in the face of what was sure to be the mass invalidations predicted by Judges O’Malley and Linn.
In confronting this challenge, the Federal Circuit has sidestepped answering the question of what exactly constitutes an
abstract idea and instead now relies on a method of matching challenged claims against past claims already deemed to be abstract.174
As patent practitioners have noted, this reliance on subjective
matching and similarity compounds the uncertainty in the patent
system and the situation is only exacerbated when neither the
Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit wish to fully articulate an
answer to that critical question.175 At least one judge on the Federal
Circuit has summarized the lack of a standard by noting that “this
court and the Supreme Court have [both] found it sufficient to
compare claims at issue to those claims already found to be
directed to an abstract idea in previous cases.”176
F. Easing the Grounds for Fee Shifting—Octane (2014)
Although shocks from Supreme Court patent jurisprudence
since 2006 have generally proven unfavorable to the overall consistency and strength of the U.S. patent system, 177 occasionally
those shocks have in fact resulted in stronger protection, albeit at
the continued termination of long-standing precedent and further
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

See id.
See id. at 221–22.
See Alice Corps. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208, 221–22 (2014).
See Quinn & Guttag, supra note 26.
See id.
Id.; see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
See supra Section II.a-e.
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decline in consistency. The Supreme Court’s reversal of the Federal Circuit in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc.178 was one such case, one that in fact strengthened the U.S.
courts’ ability to serve as an adequate venue for patent disputes.
Here, the exact details to the patent in issue are less important than
the alleged motivations behind the suit itself.
Put briefly, ICON was a manufacturer of exercise equipment
who also secured patents for new developments in the hardware.179
One such patent held by ICON, for an adjustable elliptical system,
was asserted against Octane, a fellow manufacturer of fitness
equipment.180 The district court granted Octane’s motion for summary judgment after determining that there was no infringement
but denied Octane’s subsequent motion for attorney’s fees.181 Although 35 U.S.C. § 285 permits the award of reasonable attorney
fees in “exceptional case[s],” Federal Circuit precedent required
trial judges to find either “material inappropriate conduct” in the
case or that the litigation had been brought “in subjective bad
faith” and was thus “objectively baseless.” 182 The district court
found nothing in the litigation to satisfy either ground and dismissed Octane’s motion for attorney fees, a decision later affirmed
by the Federal Circuit.183
On review, the Supreme Court again reversed the Federal
Circuit, 184 but this time in a way that would seemingly attract
patent litigants rather than drive them off. Finding that the standard
set forth in the Federal Circuit’s Brooks Furniture precedent was
“unduly rigid,” the Supreme Court determined that the previous
standard used for exceptionality “impermissibly encumber[ed] the
statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”185
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This decision was important given prevailing American norms
around litigation. Contrary to the English rule, 186 the American
rule of litigation states that each party pays their own costs and that
attorney fees are only recoverable when specified by statute in
certain actions.187 This decision thus brings American patent litigation slightly more in line with more attractive patent forums
abroad. 188 In foreign jurisdictions that follow the English rule
where the loser bears a significant percentage of litigation costs,189
patent investment and litigation would inherently be far more
attractive. This is because the rule would not only give patent trolls
more pause before filing questionable actions given the potential
financial liability, but it would also give practicing entities a more
sound state of mind knowing that blatant infringement of one’s
patent will now be less costly as the infringer will likely be the one
paying the attorney’s fees.
G. Easing the Grounds for Enhanced Damages—Halo, Stryker
(2016)
In the other exception to the general weakening of the U.S.
patent system, Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.,190
along with its consolidated case of Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer Inc.,
addressed the question of whether the Federal Circuit was enforcing too high a bar to acquire enhanced infringement damages. Halo
186
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PRACTICAL L. (Apr. 1, 2018), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-620-4407?
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and Octane can thus be considered the patent cases in recent years
to have actually strengthened the protection of a U.S. patent and to
better dissuade potential infringers.
In Halo, both Halo and Pulse were manufacturers of electronic
components.191 Halo, which owned several patents for electronic
package transformers, found Pulse producing similar products and
offered to license its patents.192 One of Pulse’s engineers reviewed
Halo’s patents and believed that the patents were invalid, whereupon Pulse continued manufacturing the transformers that allegedly infringed Halo’s patents.193 After failing to reach a license
agreement, Halo filed suit against Pulse for infringement and
secured a jury verdict finding both infringement and evidence to
suggest that Pulse had infringed willfully. 194 Halo’s motion for
enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284, however, was denied.195
In the parallel case’s facts, Stryker and Zimmer Surgical were
both competitors in the orthopedic device market.196 When Zimmer allegedly infringed one of Stryker’s patents on a “pulsed lavage device,” Stryker brought suit against Zimmer for infringement. 197 The jury in Stryker similarly found infringement and
evidence of willful infringement, but unlike in Halo, the district
judge added enhanced damages for the willful infringement, noting
that Zimmer’s business strategy seemed to expressly push legal
concerns to the side in order to compete aggressively.198
On appeal, both cases presented the same question to the Federal Circuit, whether their respective district judges had properly
utilized Federal Circuit precedent to determine the appropriateness
of enhanced damages.199 The standard, articulated in In re Seagate,
requires patent owners to show “clear and convincing evidence
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that
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its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent” and then
demonstrate that the infringement was “either known or so obvious
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” 200
The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of enhanced damages in
Halo since Halo had reportedly failed to show Pulse’s objective
recklessness; the Federal Circuit also reversed the grant of enhanced damages in Stryker, arguing that Zimmer had in fact
demonstrated “reasonable defenses” at trial to remove the potential
for enhanced damages.201
On appeal to the Supreme Court to determine the proper standard for enhanced damages, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal
Circuit and strengthened the patent system in the process.202 The
Supreme Court found that the Federal Circuit had erred in
adding additional stipulations to the statutory language concerning
monies in patent matters, holding that the statute gave no indication that enhanced damages should be predicated on a strict basis
as Seagate required; the statute in fact simply used the basic term
“may” to indicate its discretion to the trial judge.203
For the same reasons set forth above in Section II.g regarding
Octane, this Supreme Court decision also upended Federal Circuit
precedent in such a way that patent practitioners would question
what fundamentals of patent law would change next, though this
change at least strengthened the protections offered by the patent
system at the same time. Halo made American patent litigation
more palatable to innovators who may now be drawn to the jurisdiction’s newfound punitive measures for willful infringement as
opposed to the laxer standards infringers could previously hide
behind under Seagate.
H. Overturning Forum Rules and the Long Trip from Texas to
Delaware—TC Heartland (2017)
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC 204 did
not change much in the way of substantive patent law, but it did
200
201
202
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upend approximately thirty years of patent litigation focused in the
patent-plaintiff-friendly Eastern District of Texas.205
Similar to Halo, the exact nature of the patents involved is not
pertinent for the purposes of this Note. The important facts are limited to an infringement action by Kraft against TC Heartland in the
District of Delaware over an alleged product patent.206 Despite TC
Heartland being organized and headquartered in Indiana, Kraft attempted to pull TC Heartland into court in Delaware on the
longstanding premise that sale of allegedly infringing products in a
remote district is sufficient as an “act of infringement” per 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) to justify a patent infringement action in a district
to which the infringer otherwise has no ties to.207 Traditionally, this
permissive “act of infringement” language has allowed patent
owners to haul patent infringers to the Eastern District of Texas, a
federal district with notably patent-plaintiff-friendly juries and
judges, in order to acquire a favorable result and often in less time
as well.208
While TC Heartland did attempt to get the venue changed by
moving for the case to be transferred to the Southern District of
Indiana where they resided, the district court denied these arguments and determined that the case could proceed in Delaware.209
TC Heartland then petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of
mandamus, but this was denied by the appellate court. The circuit
court reasoned that the long-standing precedent, which had stood
since the venue statute was last amended in 1988, would remain as
is.210 TC Heartland subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court
which granted certiorari.211
205
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On review, the Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the
Federal Circuit. Relying on its prior analysis in Fourco Glass v.
Transmirra Products regarding the assorted interpretations of
“resides” and “residence,” 212 the Supreme Court concluded that
§ 1400(b)’s reference to “reside[nce]” refers to a business’s place
of incorporation.213
Taken as a whole, TC Heartland is likely the least impactful on
the U.S. patent system of all the cases this Note discusses, at least
in a direct manner. Whereas the other aforementioned post-2006
Supreme Court cases like Alice and eBay changed the very
fundamentals of patent practice, including patentability standards,
critical components of litigation, and standards of proof among
others, TC Heartland merely narrowed where patent disputes could
be filed.
Patent practitioners had undoubtedly become accustomed to
having to fly down to Texas and become acquainted with the local
rules, but the case’s ultimate impact on the system as a whole will
likely be how much the altered venue filings back up the assorted
districts’ dockets. Whereas the Eastern District of Texas was originally the biggest patent dispute venue, Delaware, a smaller district
with fewer judges, is quickly drawing more patent filings; this is
likely because it is the state of incorporation for most of the country’s largest publicly-traded corporations. 214 Should Delaware’s
docket quickly become swamped by the influx of filings beyond
what its current judges can handle, the average patent litigation
timeframe will get even longer, as will the average amount of time
needed to dispose of a relatively ordinary patent case.215 Consequently, while TC Heartland does not substantively affect the fundamentals of patent law, it will very likely procedurally affect the
212
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[https://perma.cc/9AKL-D83F] (raising concerns about Delaware’s smaller number of
active judges and less patent experience relative to the judges of East Texas).
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general patent system over time by shifting patent infringement
filings away from the eight district judges active in the Eastern
District of Texas and diverting many of those filings to the four
active district judges in Delaware.216
I. Signs of Extrajudicial Expansion in Patent Jurisdiction—
WesternGeco (2018)
The final case in the recent trend of reversals is WesternGeco
LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.,217 a curious instance of the Supreme Court seemingly testing the waters of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In this instance, WesternGeco owned several patents covering “lateral-steering technology” components utilized in ocean
surveying technology. 218 Not one to license or sell its patents,
WesternGeco was for a while the only oceanic surveyor using such
lateral-steering technology and profited via surveys done for oil
companies. Eventually, however, WesternGeco realized that ION
had begun selling a comparable system.219 WesternGeco discovered that ION actually had the components needed to construct a
similar system manufactured in the United States, but then shipped
those parts abroad for final assembly into a working product that
mirrored WesternGeco’s patent system.220 Upon filing suit against
ION, WesternGeco prevailed when a jury found evidence of
infringement and awarded over $100 million in royalties and
lost profits.221
ION moved to have the award of lost profits set aside as those
profits had been made outside of U.S. jurisdiction, but the motion
was denied. 222 ION thus appealed to the Federal Circuit and
acquired its requested relief when the appellate court set aside the
original award of lost damages after finding that the general in-

216

See Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships—District Courts, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronologicalhistory-authorized-judgeships-district-courts [https://perma.cc/X8XT-Q74X].
217
138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
218
See id. at 2135–36.
219
See id.
220
See id.
221
See id.
222
See id.
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fringement statute does not permit recovery of foreign profit. 223
This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court where it was
vacated and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit in 2016
to be reconsidered in light of the recent Halo decision, though
the Federal Circuit reentered judgment denying the award of
foreign profits.224
Upon returning back to the Supreme Court after another appeal, the Justices decided that lost profits could in fact be recovered based on a two-step inquiry into extraterritorial judgments
from another recent case, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. 225 In determining this question, the Court first considered
whether an existing presumption against extraterritoriality may be
rebutted and, if so, directed that the court must determine whether
the case at hand involves a domestic application of the subject
statute. 226 The majority found that the present case did in fact
involve a domestic application and so foreign profits could accordingly be awarded.227
The two-justice dissent, seemingly rare in the face of the
numerous 9–0 or 8–0 decisions in recent Supreme Court patent
cases, actually made the same argument that many IP practitioners
were themselves making 228 : permitting recovery of lost profits
from domestic IP rights could open a Pandora’s Box wherein other
countries could mirror said practice.229 As Justice Gorsuch so eloquently stated: “[T]he tables easily could be turned. If our courts
award compensation to U.S. patent owners for foreign uses where
223

See WesternGeco, 138 S.Ct. at 2135–36.
See id.
225
See id. at 2136 (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S.Ct. 2090, 2101
(2016)).
226
See id.
227
See id. at 2139.
228
See generally Brief for Intellectual Property Law Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129
(2018) (No. 16-1011); Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation and R Street Institute as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138
S. Ct. 2129 (2018) (No. 16-1011); Brief for Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc.,
the Internet Association, SAS Institute Inc., Symmetry, LLC, and Xilinx, Inc. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct.
2129 (2018) (No. 16-1011).
229
See WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143–44 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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our patents don’t run, what happens when foreign courts return the
favor?”230 His further point that Congress would likely never stand
for foreign jurisdictions awarding damages for foreign patent infringements in the United States was well made but regrettably was
not in the majority opinion. Thus, the high court threw the U.S.
patent system yet another curve ball with which to contend.
III. AN (UN)PATENTED FIX
With a brief patent background now in mind, as well as a
summation of the recent string of Supreme Court reversals, the
question presented is what exactly can be done to reverse the apparent degradation of the U.S. patent system. Similar to the problem itself, the most straightforward solution is hardly new: get
Congress to amend the patent system.231
The last significant amendment to the U.S. patent system came
in 2011 when President Barrack Obama signed into law the
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).232 The AIA enacted a
number of important changes to the existing system, such as shifting from a first-to-invent system to first-to-file, 233 creating the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board as a separate venue to dispute
patent validity,234 and fine-tuning a number of smaller application
requirements.235 Notably absent from the AIA, however, was any
guidance or change to the assorted areas of patent law the Supreme
Court had ruled on in the five years since eBay. Despite the signif230

Id. at 2143.
See Ken Blackwell, Time to Reverse America’s Innovative Decline, AM. THINKER
(Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2018/04/time_to_reverse_
americas_innovation_decline.html [https://perma.cc/M4NW-S26H]; see also Mark
Marrello, Urge the Drafters of the New Section 101 to Support Inventor-Friendly Reform,
IP WATCHDOG (May 13, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/13/urge-draftersnew-section-101-support-inventor-friendly-reform/id=109206/ [https://perma.cc/W3SAH845]; Quinn, supra note 7.
232
AIA, supra note 3.
233
Whereas the United States previously granted patents for inventions to the
individual or entity that first invented a new concept, the AIA changed the system such
that the first individual or entity to file for said new concept would be the one entitled to
the patent. See id. § 3.
234
See id. § 7.
235
See generally AIA, supra note 3.
231
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icant changes to the patent system that came in 2006 with eBay and
in 2008 with KSR, there was no legislative change to injunctive
relief or obviousness standards within the AIA. The larger, more
impactful ramifications of the Supreme Court’s patent decisions
since 2006 had apparently been ignored by Congress upon enactment of the AIA.
Since then, bipartisan members of Congress, both in the House
and in the Senate, introduced the Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience Patents
Act of 2018, or STRONGER Patents Act of 2018.236 However, this
pending bill is not sufficient, at least as currently written, to
adequately repair the U.S. patent system in light of the numerous
judicial changes that it has endured over the last two decades.
To the proposed bill’s credit, it does expressly direct judges to
grant injunctive relief upon finding patent validity and infringement. 237 However, it fails to address the numerous other issues
arising from the recent Supreme Court cases, all of which sparked
sufficient feedback that Congress would be shirking its responsibilities were it to leave those issues unmentioned. Despite the slew of
eligibility cases like Alice, Myriad, and Mayo, the bill offers little
to no clarification for patent applicants and owners. 238 The bill
similarly fails to offer any response to TC Heartland and the
migration of patent cases from the East Texas to Delaware federal
court districts despite the clear difference in judicial resources to
efficiently process and resolve those disputes.239
By failing to comprehensively and systematically address all
of the issues raised in the Supreme Court patent cases since 2006,
Congress is again slapping a small bandage on a wound that requires a more surgical approach. This dilemma was all the more
frustrated by the changes of the 2011 AIA which resulted in additional patent issues to add atop those raised by the Supreme Court

236
See Blackwell, supra note 231; STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th
Cong. (2018).
237
See STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. § 106 (2018).
238
See generally id. (no changes with regard to § 101 eligibility).
239
See generally id. (no changes with regard to appropriate venue to file patent
actions).
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decisions.240 Just as Congress in 2011 failed to include an adequate
solution to at least partly remedy the abrupt about-face that eBay
represented five years prior, so too does the STRONGER Patents
Act fail to address some of the more pressing issues to arise from
Supreme Court decisions this past decade.241
This is not to say that the STRONGER Patents Act is a bad
idea. The fact that the bill is on the minds of at least some members of Congress is a sign of progress as the bill can be amended to
serve as a vehicle for the changes needed to firmly set the U.S.
patent system on a better track. While in the meantime Director
Iancu has been commendably attempting to single-handedly stop
the patent system’s bleeding with USPTO directives and guidance
letters, comprehensive legislative reform is what would best correct the overall system’s state of affairs.242
A. Specific, Targeted Legislation Written Via Consensus
To properly remedy the patent system via legislation, congressional members should supplement any information contained in
lobbying group proposals with actual input from constituents
already familiar with the system. By beginning the fact-finding at
this level, lawmakers would ensure that the interests of all concerned districts are represented in some manner to better reflect the
different views that said districts hold depending on their respective industry representation.
240

See Steve Brachmann, STRONGER Patents Act Introduced in House, Seeks to
Strengthen a Crippled Patent System, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ip
watchdog.com/2018/03/26/stronger-patents-act-house/id=95188/
[https://perma.cc/H9NM-EEVG] (referring to the myriad of concerns arising from the
post-grant review proceedings conducted at the AIA-created Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, namely parallel challenges in district courts, the suppressive effect such
proceedings have on patent values and company stock, and the ability for multiple
challenges to be filed in what could be considered a harassing manner).
241
See generally STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. (2018)
(failing to, for example, mention any definition of an “abstract idea” despite it being the
subject of three controversial Supreme Court decisions).
242
See generally Statement Delivered Before the United States House Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet Committee on the Judiciary, 116th
Congress (2019) (Statement of Director Iancu), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/newsupdates/statement-director-iancu-united-states-house-subcommittee-courts-intellectual
[https://perma.cc/APJ9-L22F]; Korenchan, supra note 27; Quinn, Iancu, supra note 81.
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As an example, by balancing the interests of tech-heavy
districts wary of nebulous eligibility standards following Alice with
the interests of districts with many pro-patent pharmaceutical companies, a more widely appealing consensus could be derived. Failure to do so would likely serve as a repeat of the AIA: a collection
of good ideas with the best of intentions, but utterly infuriating in
other aspects for failing to address perceived shortcomings. This is
not to say Congress should give their patent-practicing constituents
carte blanche to write the bill as they please, but should instead
take into account the input of those already intimately familiar with
the system.
Still, it would be naïve to assume that everyone interested in
how patents are reformed could agree on a singular version of a
bill, particularly given how vocal members of the prominent tech
industry have been in deriding the Federal Circuit as a whole for
what they believe are overly protective rulings. 243 Regardless,
while Congress should generally go about its bill crafting process
as usual by allowing individuals and interest groups to send in their
submissions, thoughts, and drafts, it is paramount that the resultant
bill at least addresses each of the concerns raised by practitioners
in the wake of so many Supreme Court patent decisions that have
routinely upset patent norms.244
A cursory glance of the two dozen or so patent cases from the
Supreme Court since eBay in 2006 makes it eminently clear that
there are disputes in the patent system that everyone involved
would agree require clarification, whether it be the constant buzz
of practitioners publishing general grievances online245 or the far
more noteworthy instances where the judicial figures handling

243
See generally Timothy Lee, Google Asks Supreme Court to Overrule Disastrous
Ruling on API Copyright, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 1, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2019/01/google-asks-supreme-court-to-overrule-disastrous-ruling-on-apicopyrights/ [https://perma.cc/F9CT-68ED] (noting how non-patent practitioners
interested primarily in technology and copyright law still have an opinion of the Federal
Circuit and would therefore likely be interested in how the appellate court’s jurisprudence
is tweaked).
244
See supra Section II.
245
See sources cited supra note 21.
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such disputes blatantly call for congressional action in their opinions.246
It therefore becomes imperative to reform the patent system
such that it complies with the collaborative nature of Congress
while at the same time addressing all of the legitimate concerns
that have arisen in the last decade or so.247 This means that actual
consideration must be given to the issues raised in the abovedescribed cases, including what exactly constitutes an abstract
idea,248 whether permanent injunctive relief in patent infringement
actions really must be beholden to the traditional four-factor test,249
how exactly lost foreign profits should be approached, 250 and
whether venue selection should be limited if the dockets of certain
district courts become saturated and backed-up.251
As a relatively objective matter, the question of abstract ideas
really must be addressed before these other issues. Put most suc246

See Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Judges’ Plea to Reps Shows Patent-Eligibility Angst,
LAW360 (June 4, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1049274 [https://perma.cc/
HYU9-Z2Q2]; see also Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (denying
petition for en banc hearing). In her concurrence in Berkheimer, Judge Lourie, joined by
Judge Newman, states that “the law needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by
Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the innovation field consider
are [Section] 101 problems.” 890 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). She adds that
“[i]ndividual cases, whether heard by this court or the Supreme Court, are imperfect
vehicles for enunciating broad principles because they are limited to the facts
presented. Section 101 issues certainly require attention beyond the power of this court.”
Id.
247
This chance for reform also represents a critical opportunity for a divided Congress
to agree on a fairly non-divisive matter. Contrary to some of the more attention-grabbing
matters that split public opinion like defense spending, entitlement spending, firearm
regulation, and certain civil rights, IP protection is a matter that sees comparatively little
opposition and is therefore ripe for minimally opposed reform. See generally 115 P.L.
264, 132 Stat. 3676, 2018 Enacted H.R. 1551, 115 Enacted H.R. 1551, 115 P.L. 264, 132
Stat. 3676, 2018 Enacted H.R. 1551, 115 Enacted H.R. 1551 (representing one of the few
substantive legislative changes, an update to IP rights, to pass Congress in a time of
severe division); Elliot Fink, Musical Copyrights as a Rare-Instance[sic] of
Bipartisanship: The House Passes H.R. 1551 The Music Modernization Act, FORDHAM
IPLJ BLOG (Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2018/10/01/musical-copyrightsas-a-rare-instance-of-bipartisanship-the-house-should-pass-h-r-1551-the-musicmodernization-act/ [https://perma.cc/SQW4-V9ZQ].
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cinctly by retired Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Randall Rader,
“you have cases like eBay . . . Alice, Mayo, and Myriad, all of
which have severely handicapped the innovative capacity of the
United States.”252 Whereas nations like China are now benefiting
from America’s seeming aversion to software patents and other
ideas that tangentially touch the abstract,253 the U.S. patent system
can recapture some of the lost innovation and restore some certainty by simply clarifying what exactly is patentable through a
revision of § 101. Innovation is thought to be lessened and the value of patents diminished when certainty in the promised rights
falls, 254 so the inverse can and should be expected. So long as
patents are not threatened with invalidation because the subject
matter exists in a grey area as a result of case law, innovation can
be expected to increase, contrary to the current decline. It simply
starts with amending § 101 to clarify the questions left by Mayo,
Myriad, and Alice, and, by extension, answering the pleas of countless practitioners and even a few judges.
With regard to the matter of eBay, it is difficult to get behind
the old method of permanent injunctive relief absent exceptional
circumstances given the proliferation of patent trolls who attempt
to extort license agreements like in the titular case.255 However, to
keep the four-factor test that so grossly weighs against the most
fundamental right inherent to patents is doubly impermissible. One
possible way around the dilemma would be to include a provision
to update 35 U.S.C. § 273—Defense to infringement based on
prior commercial use. The eBay decision came out in 2006 based
on a patent application that was filed in 1995, the same year that
eBay began operating, and was only granted in 1998. The original
action in district court was resolved in 2002, a full four years after
the patent was granted and five years after eBay had started operating. The current statute, added in 1999, permits a prior use defense
if said commercial use occurred at least one year prior to the application’s filing date, which could have covered eBay at the time but
is not clear given the uncertainty as to exactly when their online
252
253
254
255

See Quinn, Iancu, supra note 81.
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See generally sources cited supra note 52.
See supra Section II.A.
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auction website as currently recognized began to operate. To
that end, a return to the previous rule of liberally granted permanent injunctions could be effectively balanced against troll abuse
by amending § 273 to permit a greater grace period of prior
use protection.
The other two express problems mentioned are slightly easier
to address. Given that the greatest detriment to the patent system
from TC Heartland is likely to be a crowding of certain district
courts, a simple amendment to authorize additional judges should
more than suffice. As it stands, the District of Delaware has only
four active judges whereas the old patent forum of choice, the
Eastern District of Texas, has eight. A review of the assorted districts, their dockets, and case-per-judge metrics would quickly
yield the necessary information to add additional seats for active
judges, particularly those in districts experiencing rises in patent
filings. As for WesternGeco and its ideas on extraterritorial jurisdiction, a clear, express statement that U.S. patents control commerce within the United States should be included in the new legislation, just enough to adequately state Congress’ position and
dissuade other nations from implementing policies permitting similar lost profit actions against American entities.
B. Further Rationalization and Explanation from the Supreme
Court in Reversals
Congressional action is undoubtedly the most effective and
plausible solution which the patent community can pursue, particularly because its participants, the elected politicians, are actually
beholden to the will of the people through elections. However,
should Congress prove unwilling or unable to pass adequate
reform, intermediary relief with regard to the recent uncertainties
like Alice could at least be sought from the Supreme Court. Should
an appropriate case arise, and should the high court be adequately
swayed by the pleas for clarity by practitioners, frustrated congressional members, or both, the Supreme Court could use such a case
as a vehicle to deliver more concrete grounds for the patent system
to operate on, as well as a resolution to the underlying case.
There is of course no way in which to actively implement said
alternative since the Justices are not beholden to anyone in the
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same way that Congress is, but making such a plea is not implausible. Generally, the high court does seem reluctant to take such
cases where a congressional solution is possible and arguably the
better solution. However, if Congress remains as gridlocked as it is
today, it is conceivable that a collective plea from both practitioners and lower court opinions to the Supreme Court to clear up
ambiguity in the patent law jurisprudence may yield additional
reviews and ultimately prove beneficial since any concrete input
from the high court would prove useful. The requested clearer language in a subsequent patent case would either elucidate past
ambiguities from previous decisions, such as abstract inventions in
Alice, or further muddy the jurisprudence and thus put additional
pressure on Congress to cooperate and pass more comprehensive
reform.
The Supreme Court using a new patent case to resolve an ambiguity stemming from a past case would truly be beneficial, as it
would mean one fewer ambiguity for practitioners to contend with.
Alternatively, should the Supreme Court use a new patent case to
either worsen an existing ambiguity or disturb yet another facet of
patent law to further disturb the U.S. patent system, it would undoubtedly be inconvenient to practitioners, but also would at least
strengthen the case for drastic, urgent patent reform to Congress.
The latter course of action would effectively be the equivalent of
throwing gasoline on a fire in order to attract a disinterested person’s attention. This escalation of course appears harmful in the
short run, but should further delay occur while Congress continually proves uncooperative and as the patent system falls deeper
into disarray, then the legal community’s options may be so limited that such a course of action might seem advisable.
CONCLUSION
Although the Federal Circuit did not quite push back against
the Supreme Court’s rulings in eBay or KSR, they did offer up
some resistance in 2012–2013 during the remands of Myriad and
Mayo. Ever since, there has been a subtle friction between the
nation’s highest court and its patent specialist appellate court. To
summarize said friction and subsequent court decisions as simply
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resulting in uncertainty in the jurisprudence does not quite do the
situation justice.
Aside from the general uncertainty about when patent practice
will again abruptly change, patents as property rights in the United
States have lost a significant amount of the bite that they once had
and were inherently meant to possess. In other words, though U.S.
patents are still potent against infringers and valuable as property
rights, they are arguably less powerful and less valuable, relatively
speaking, because of this uncertainty in the system. The validity of
at least tens of thousands of patents remain in question given nebulous standards as to patent eligibility. The continued abrupt changes to the patent system have led to some of the judges involved in
the friction to openly ask America’s elected officials to do their
jobs and implement reform legislation. This does not even account
for whatever incentives are being offered abroad to attract innovation away from America. Thus, America’s patent system is long
due for an extensive overhaul.
Admittedly, patent law is by no means the most exciting,
newsworthy subject. This is certainly true in a world where there
are striking news stories meant to capture everyone’s attention
every few minutes. It also does not help that so few people actively
interact with the patent system on a regular or even semi-regular
basis. None of that, though, diminishes the importance of the
patent system as a whole, nor does it detract from the fact it
requires reform soon, before additional ambiguity and uncertainty
arise from further disagreements between the Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court. Should no remedial measures be taken, one of the
most important foundational pieces of America’s commerce will
likely continue to degrade in such a way that it will eventually
impact the average American once commercial entities adjust their
strategic operations to account for these relatively weaker IP
protections.

